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Note: Constitutionality of Remedial Minority
Preferences in Employment
During the past decade, a growing controversy has developed
concerning effective judicial implementation of equal employ-
ment opportunity.' The issue central to this controversy is
whether a federal district court is empowered to fashion a rem-
edy in employment discrimination cases which accords preferen-
tial treatment based on race, specifically, whether minority pref-
erences in employment are a permissible means of accomplishing
equal employment opportunity.
Cases of employment discrimination may arise in the federal
courts under three separate statutory provisions. Acts of public
discrimination for the most part are covered by the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 2 and Section 1981 of
Title 42 of the United States Code.3 Private acts of discrimina-
tion, on the other hand, are governed by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19644 and possibly by Section 1981. 5
Effective redress of a violation of these rights relies on the
1. See generally Note, The Philadelphia Plan: Remedial Racial
Classification in Employment, 58 GEo. L.J. 1187, 1187-88 (1969-70).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). This section
was originally enacted as Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act of
Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, pursuant to the then recently rati-
fied Thirteenth Amendment. At least in part because of doubts as to
the Congressional power to enact this provision under the Thirteenth
Amendment, Congress reenacted it in 1870 after the passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144.
See Note, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 36 U. Cxi. L. REv. 615, 617-21 (1969). Section 1981 reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the se-
curity of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1964).
5. Until 1968 it was not thought that Section 1982 (42 U.S.C.
§ 1982) reached private acts of discrimination. But Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), applied that section to all acts of dis-
crimination, private as well as public. Although the Court has not
addressed itself to the similar issue with respect to Section 1981, ar-
gument by analogy suggests that Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1870), is likewise applicable to private acts
of discrimination.
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vast equitable power vested in the federal district court.6 It is
the permissible scope of this power which has been the subject
of growing concern. The declaration that separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal7 forced the federal courts to de-
vise new remedies adequate to deal with the effects of discrimi-
nation. These courts were faced with the alternative of merely
rendering a decree which proscribed future discrimination or
awarding remedial relief as well to eliminate the vestiges of
past discrimination. The resolution of this problem can be found
in the language of Louisiana v. United States,8 wherein the Su-
preme Court described the role of a court, once discrimination had
been shown, as:
not merely the power, but the duty to render a decree which
will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of
the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future9
Accordingly, the courts have not adopted a restrictive attitude
in ordering affirmative relief in discrimination cases. As a re-
sult, with respect to the civil rights of minority groups, signifi-
cant efforts have been made to promote such policies as open
and fair housing,10 desegregation of public facilities,1 equal
voting rights'1 2 and school integration. 13
6. The extent of this power was recently emphasized by the
Supreme Court:
Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a
district court's equitable power to remedy past wrongs is broad,
for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.
Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
7. Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
8. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
9. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
10. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (discrimination pro-
hibited in determination of eligibility for and administration of low
cost housing); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (repeal of open
housing law violates equal protection); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968) (congressional prohibition on private discrimina-
tion in sale or lease of property valid under Thirteenth Amendment
and Civil Rights Act of 1866); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)(state may not grant right to private discrimination in sale of land);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (racial covenants in real prop-
erty contracts cannot be enforced).
11. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (swimming pool);
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (swimming pool); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (restaurant); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (restaurant and motel).
12. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (voters' qualifications);
Gaston County v. United States, 394 U.S. 285 (1969) (literacy test);
Handott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969) (candidates' qualifications);
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (voters' qualifica-
tions).
13. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
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In many instances current discrimination and present ef-
fects of past discrimination can be abolished in a single stroke as,
for example, in the case of desegregation of a swimming pool.
Yet in areas which require affirmative action to achieve equality
of opportunity, judicial remedies have fallen short of achieving
racial balance and eliminating the vestiges of past discrimina-
tion. A possible explanation for this shortcoming is an ap-
parent hesitation to fashion a remedy which treats races differ-
ently. It is the thesis of this note that a minority preference is
one effective remedy which has been avoided for this reason
and, consequently, those areas in which this kind of preference
is the only appropriate remedy have fallen well behind other
fronts in the struggle to eliminate the effects of past discrimina-
tion.
This note will examine whether a remedial minority prefer-
ence, in fact, falls within the scope of the Supreme Court's man-
date in Louisiana v. United States.1 4 By tracing the development
of employment discrimination cases, the focus will be on the so-
cial and legal consequences of the award of a minority prefer-
ence. In particular, it will examine whether minority prefer-
ences are permitted by or, indeed, proscribed by Civil Rights
legislation (Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866' 5 or
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) 11; and, ultimately,
whether minority preferences are constitutionally permissible.
I. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
Some sort of compensatory measures are necessary in em-
ployment discrimination cases to prevent the vestiges of past
discrimination from enduring well beyond the issuance of the
order banning future discrimination. The reason for this is the
relative infrequency with which persons generally change em-
ployment, which tends to freeze the current racial composition
of the labor force. In other words, unless affirmative programs
directed at more than merely barring future discrimination are
instituted upon the finding of past discrimination, it may well
(effective, immediate desegregation); Dowell v. Board of Ed., 396 U.S.
269 (1969) (immediate desegregation); Alexander v. Holmes County
Bd. of Ed., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (immediate desegregation); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ("freedom of choice" integration
unconstitutional).
14. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
15. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (now 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970) ).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (1964).
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be an entire generation before that particular industry reflects
a cross-section of a nondiscriminating society.
Apparently aware of this reality, courts have included in
their decrees various affirmative measures aimed at eliminating
the effects of past discrimination. Typical of such measures
found in employment discrimination cases are: elimination of
high school diploma requirements where no significant rela-
tion between the possession of a high school education and the
nature of the employment has been shown,17 disregard of arrest
records and felony convictions as an absolute bar to employ-
ment,18 orders requiring a process of test validation 9 for exam-
inations administered as a prerequisite for employment " and,
finally, implementation of affirmative minority recruitment pro-
grams.21
However, in the last five years, judicial decrees have in-
cluded more far reaching relief when it became apparent that
these affirmative measures would fall short of significantly re-
ducing the effects of past discrimination.2 2  These decrees sug-
17. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Roman v. Rey-
nolds Metal Co., 3 (CCH) E.P.D. 8072 (S.D. Tex., Nov. 18, 1970).
18. Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Greg-
ory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Calif. 1970). See also,
Comment, Arrest Records as a Racially Discriminatory Employment
Criterion, 6 HARV. Civ. RiGHTS & Crv. LMERIS L. REv. 165 (1970); Note,
Discrimination on the Basis of Arrest Records, 56 CoRNELL L. REv.
470 (1971).
19. The process of test validation involves a sociological study to
determine whether an examination incorporates any "cultural bias"
which would screen out minority applicants or whether the results on
the examination would be in fact predictive of actual performance on
the job. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, No. 4-70 Civ. 399, 3 (BNA) F.E.P.
692 (D. Minn. March 9, 1971).
20. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Hicks v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970); Arrington
v. Massachusetts Bay Trans. Authority, 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass.
1969). See also Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Em-
ployment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring
and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969); Note, Legal Implications
of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment and Education,
68 COLUM. L. REv. 691 (1968).
21. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.
1969). Cf. Durham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th
Cir. 1970).
22. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, No. 4-70 Civ. 399, 3 (BNA) F.E.P.
692 (D. Minn March 9, 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 452 F.2d 315,
317-27 (8th Cir. 1971), modified on rehearing en banc, 452 F.2d 315,
327-32 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3557 (May 23, 1972)(No. 71-1265); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544
(9th Cir. 1971), appeal from 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler,
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gest a trend toward the use of an absolute minority preference
in hiring designed to function somewhat similar to a veterans'
preference.23  Such a minority preference, however, would
not continue indefinitely as does the veterans' preference, but
rather would operate for a fixed period 24 or on a one-time basis.2r
Whether such a trend exists can better be evaluated after an
examination of recent case developments in the area and an
analysis of the factors underlying the basic reluctance to order
these affirmative remedies.
In 1967 a Title VII action by the United States against a
union allegedly guilty of discriminatory employment practices,
United States v. Asbestos Workers, Local 53,20 was consolidated
with an action by an individual workman against the same union,
Vogler v. McCarty, Inc.27  The district court issued a prelimi-
nary injunction requiring the immediate admission of four spe-
cified minority persons to membership in an all-white union.
Those four persons previously had sought referrals to jobs
within the union's jurisdiction with no success. The injunction
further provided for the future referral of blacks on an alternat-
ing basis with whites. The Fifth Circuit upheld this one-for-one
referral as the only meaningful means of countering the present
effects of past discrimination2 8 after apparently considering the
407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Local 10, Sheet Metal
Workers, 3 (CCH) E.P.D. 8068 (D. N.J. 1970); United States v. Central
Motor Lines, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. N.C. 1970).
23. A veterans' preference is achieved by either absolutely pre-
ferring a veteran who has at least attained the minimum qualifying
score over any other applicant or by designating a number of bonus
points which a veteran may add to the score he received on an employ-
ment test. Almost every state has such an act. See generally, 56 AM.
JuR. 90, Veterans and Veterans Acts § 11. The main problem with
analogy to the veterans preference is that the great majority of jobs,
especially those for which large numbers of blacks are closest to being
qualified, are not filled through the type of white collar tests to which
such preferences are usually keyed. Also, the analogy is inapposite since
the courts traditionally have determined that equal protection and
due process require at least that any government action which is predi-
cated upon race must be necessary to the attainment of an overriding
governmental purpose. Where classifications not on the basis of race are
pronounced, it is only necessary to demonstrate a reasonable basis for
such classifications. But see note 127 and accompanying text infra.
24. E.g., until racial balance in a particular industry is achieved.
25. E.g., when coupled with other affirmative relief.
26. 294 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. La. 1967).
27. Id.
28. Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1055 (5th
Cir. 1969). The court specifically approved the alternative referral
system on the basis of the authorization in Section 706(g) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 "to order such affirmative action as may be ap-
propriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 5(g).
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respective merits of alternative remedies. That formula was
subsequently continued by the district court in its final grant
of relief.29 The court order did not limit the relief to blacks
who had worked or attempted to work with the union although
it did give them priority.30 Vogler was the first instance of a
court providing any such "preference" in hiring accorded solely
on the basis of race.
Subsequently the Ninth Circuit also sanctioned relief of this
nature. In United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,31 a district
court order was upheld directing three Joint Apprenticeship
and Training Committees which previously had discriminated
against blacks to fill 30 per cent of their future training classes
with blacks to the extent that qualified black applicants
were available. Here again, the court required no showing
that the beneficiaries of the remedial relief would be identi-
fied victims of past discrimination. The court, citing Vogler,32
approved the validity of the trial court order on the basis of the
district court's broad remedial power under Title VII to remove
the vestiges of past discrimination, eliminate the present obstacles
and assure the nonexistence of future barriers to the full enjoy-
ment of equal job opportunities by qualified black workers. 3
The one-for-one formula developed in Vogler has been fol-
lowed by the district courts. In United States v. Central Motor
Lines, Inc.,3 4 on a motion for a preliminary injunction in a "pat-
tern or practice"3 5 Title VII case, the court ordered the immedi-
29. Vogler v. McCarty, 1970 Lab. Cas. (70-62 at 6611) 1 9411 (ED.
La., Feb. 19, 1970).
30. Id. at 6615.
31. 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), appeal from 315 F. Supp. 1202
(W.D. Wash. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
32. 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
33. United States v. Ironworkers Local No. 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553
(9th Cir. 1971).
34. 325 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. N.C. 1970).
35. "Pattern or practice" cases are generic actions arising under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.(1964). The phrase derives from 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a): "Whenever
the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or
group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the
full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this [title] . . . ." The
phrase is not defined in Title V11, but some guidance is offered by the
legislative history and court interpretation of this and other Civil Rights
Acts employing the same terminology. The rule seems to be that such a
pattern or practice is present where the denial of rights is more than
an isolated, sporadic or accidental incident, but is repeated, routine or of
a generalized nature. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d
544, 552 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Mayton, 335 F.2d 153, 158 (5th
Cir. 1964); United States v. Ramsey, 331 F.2d 824, 834 (5th Cir. 1964)
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ate employment of six black over-the-road drivers and further
ordered that any subsequent hiring of over-the-road drivers be
done on a one-to-one ratio of whites to blacks. In United States
v. Local 10, Sheet Metal Workers,'3 also a Title VII action, the
district court ordered that referrals of temporary apprentices or
seasonal help be made on a one-for-one basis. Finally, in two
cases arising under the Equal Protection Clause, United States
v. Frazer37 and NAACP v. Allen,3 8 the one-for-one formula was
incorporated in the remedy. In the former case the court ordered
that the ratio of black to white temporary appointments be
equivalent to the ratio of black to white population in the state.
In the latter, the court required subsequent hiring be on a
one-for-one basis until 25 per cent of the work force was black.
In addition to the cases mentioned above, relief similar to that
approved in Vogler has been incorporated in numerous consent
decrees in Title VII39 and Section 198140 actions.
All of the preceding decrees are minority preferences to the
extent that the one-to-one ratio does not reflect the proportion
of minority-to-white persons in the employment market in the
relevant population area.41 Yet these decrees, of course, do not
(Judge Revas concurring and dissenting in part); Hearings Before the
House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 1037, 86th Cong. 2nd Sess.
13; 110 Cong. Rec. 14270 (1964).
36. 3 (CCH) E.P.D. 8068 (D. N.J. 1970).
37. 317 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
38. Civ. Action No. 2709-N (M.D. Ala., Feb. 10, 1972).
39. United States v. Nevada Resort Ass'n, Civ. Action No. LV
1645 (D. Nev. 1971) (one-for-three black referral and hiring ratios);
United States v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., Civ. Action No.
638-70-R (E.D. Va. 1971) (25% of new bargaining unit hired to be
blacks); United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 3 (CCH) E.P.D. 1 8306
(E.D.N.C. 1971) (next six welder learners, mechanic learners or machin-
ist learners to be blacks); United States v. Local 302, Operating Engi-
neers, 3 (CCH) E.P.D. 8149 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (hire two blacks for each
white); United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 3 (CCH) E.P.D. 8052
(N.D. Ohio 1971) (two out of next four foremen in the Assembly Press
Department and two out of next four men in the Plastic Department to
be female); United States v. Local 46, Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers, No.
68 Civ. 2116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (invalidated apprentice waiting lists and re-
quired immediate indenture of 25 non-white apprentices).
40. Coffey v. Braddy, No. 71-44 Civ. J. (M.D. Fla., Aug. 12, 1971).
41. Simple cognizance of the laws of probability reveals that,
given the absence of discriminatory barriers to employment, the sample
of those seeking employment in a particular industry would reflect
roughly the composition of the region's population. This, of course, is a
superficial conclusion. Those industries requiring special skills, training
or education could expect that the sample would vary proportionately
to the composition of the group actually possessing those skills or educa-
tion. For example, among college graduates the percentage of blacks is
less than the percentage of blacks in the population as a whole. Racial
[Vol. 56:842
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have the impact of an absolute minority preference such as was
before the court in Carter v. Gallagher.42
Carter was a class action seeking the effective implementa-
tion of equal employment opportunity.43 At the time the suit
was initiated there were no minority employees in the 540-man
Minneapolis Fire Department, and in the preceding quarter cen-
tury that department had employed only one black fire fighter.
The lower court found evidence of past racial discrimination in
hiring practices in violation of 42 U.S.C §§ 1981 and 1983 and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pros-
pective relief was ordered similar to that commonly awarded in
other employment discrimination actions. The decree provided
for the elimination of any high school diploma requirement, 4
disregard of arrest records and felonies as an absolute bar,4 5
test validation,46 adjustment of entry level ages47 and imple-
mentation of affirmative recruitment programs.4 8  Also, upon
the finding that changes in employment practices which re-
cently had been implemented or would be implemented pursuant
to the court's order would be ineffective to remedy the vestiges
ratios in jobs requiring a college education, then, must reflect this
subclass of the population. See also Chance v. Board of Examiners, 3(CCH) E.P.D. 8282 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1971).
42. No. 4-70 Civ. 399, 3 (BNA) F.E.P. 692 (D. Minn. March 9, 1971)
af-'d in part, rev'd. in part, 452 F.2d 315, 317-27 (8th Cir. 1971), modified
on-rehearing en banc, 452 F.2d 315, 327-32 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3557 (May 23, 1972) (No. 71-1265).
43. Two of the plaintiffs represented the class of all minority
applicants for the position of fire fighter with the Minneapolis Fire
Department. One represented a class of minority persons who felt that
there was insufficient opportunity for a minority person to become a
fire fighter and therefore refused or neglected to seek such employment.
The remaining two men represented a class of persons who seek civil
service employment in Minneapolis and who are veterans but who
were unable to qualify for a veterans preference pursuant to Mn.u.
STAT. § 197A5 (1969) because they have not lived in the State of Minne-
sota and in the City of Minneapolis for a period of five years. De-
fendants were the Minneapolis Civil Service Commissioner, the Minne-
apolis Fire Chief and the Personnel Director of the Civil Service Com-
mission. Subsequently, the Minneapolis Commission on Human Rights
intervened on behalf of the plaintiffs.
44. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
45. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
46. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
47. Plaintiffs cited no cases as supporting this type of remedial
relief per se. Rather the reduction in entry level minimum was ap-
parently supported on the ground that it was a reasonable provision in
an effective recruitment program. See text accompanying note 21
supra. The temporary expansion of the maximum age requirement wasjustified by reason of past discrimination.
48. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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of past racial discrimination and upon the authority of Section
1981, 4 9 the court ordered the immediate certification of 20 quali-
fied minority applicants.
This district court decree, subsequently found unconstitu-
tional by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,"0 was the first
instance of an absolute minority preference in hiring offered to
minorities as a class, rather than to identified, direct victims
of past discrimination. It differs from other one-for-one decrees
in at least three significant ways. First, with the exception of
United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc.,r' most other one-
for-one orders involved admission to unions or union referrals.
Such decrees at most affect the frequency with which a union
member attains employment and not the fundamental procure-
ment of employment itself. That is, no one is deprived of a per-
manent job when a court orders a union to refer its members to
jobs on a one-for-one basis. Those union members adversely
affected by such modifications of employment frequency, al-
though suffering some hardship (or alternatively, not enjoying
as great a benefit), are not actually deprived of employment
through the operation of the one-for-one formula.
Second, even where, as in Central Motor Lines, the one-for-
one formula is applied to actual hiring, it can be argued that the
one-for-one formula is in fact only a lesser form of a minority
preference. Indeed, in Carter v. Gallagher, absolute minority
preference had been ordered in the lower court for 20 minority
applicants. Yet there were in fact 40 openings in the Min-
neapolis Fire Department.52 Numerically, then, the effects of
the absolute preference in Carter and the one-for-one decrees
in other actions are indistinguishable. However, the dissimilar-
ity lies in the seniority and tenure principles operative in each
case. Tenure generally is based on duration of employment. In
the event that both defendant employers were to lay off on a
seniority basis a number of employees sometime subsequent to
the operation of the beneficial formula, theoretically an equal
number of whites and minority workers would be terminated
49. Plaintiffs proceeded under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) to avoid the
possibility of convening a three judge court if the minority preference
was considered on constitutional grounds. Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for Injunctive Relief, at 56, dated February 19, 1971,
Carter v. Gallagher, No. 4-70 Civ. 399 (D. Minn. March 9, 1971).
50. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 327-32 (8th Cir. 1972) (re-
hearing en banc).
51. 325 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. N.C. 1970).
52. Appendix at 156-57, Carter v. Gallagher, No. 4-70 Civ. 399,
3 (BNA) F.E.P. 692 (D. Minn. March 9,1971).
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in a one-for-one case, whereas this would not be true in the ab-
solutely preferred case. Those beneficiaries of the preference
would be the last to go since they are the first to be hired.
Finally, unlike other precedents, the lower court's prefer-
ence in Carter was not designed to achieve racial balance in the
Minneapolis Fire Department.53 Once the ordered certification
had been accomplished, there was to be no attempt to regulate
subsequent hiring on a ratio basis. Rather, it was the finding
of the lower court that the minority preference in conjunction
with the other prospective remedies would be sufficient both to
dispel the effects of past discrimination as well as bar discrimi-
nation in the future.54
Apparently the issue of "reverse discrimination" troubled the
Eighth Circuit, since the court concluded that "section 1981 and
the Fourteenth Amendment proscribe any discrimination in em-
ployment, whether the discrimination be against whites or
against blacks."55 So far only one other court has adopted this
view. In Castro v. Beecher,56 the court made the following
findings: the statistics did not make out a prima facie case of
discrimination; none of the defendants had any intent, motive,
plan, or like purposeful policy to discriminate against any plain-
tiff; no affirmative recruitment program could legally be im-
posed on the defendant employer; and, while the educational
53. The minority population in Minneapolis comprises 6.44% of
the total population. Finding 22, Carter v. Gallagher, No. 4-70 Civ.
399, 3 (BNA) F.E.P. 692, 695 (D. Minn. March 9, 1971). Thus, a true
racial balance would require the certification of 35 minority applicants.
54. Findings 139 and 140, Carter v. Gallagher, No. 4-70 Civ. 399, 3
(BNA) F.E.P. 692, 707 (D. Minn. March 9, 1971), state:
139. The practical result of the failure or refusal of the Court
to grant a minority preference would be, in all probability, to
limit the number of successful minority applicants, even if ad-
ditional fire fighters are certified, to a very small number.
140. Even if adequate steps are taken to revise the fire fighter
qualifications to remove existing requirements which create
barriers to employment that affect a disproportionate number
of minority persons, the addition of such a small number of
minority persons to the Minneapolis Fire Department will not
overcome the continuing effects of past discrimination and will
not dispell [sic] the continued effects of that Department's bad
reputation for fair employment practices with respect to mi-
nority persons. What is needed now to correct the effects of
the past twenty-five years is the immediate certification of at
least twenty minority fire fighters.
See also text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
55. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 325 (8th Cir. 1971).
56. 334 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971). Castro was an action un-
der the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1871 by Negro and Spanish-
surnamed applicants for employment with various police forces against
the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission.
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and physical job qualifications had the effect of excluding cer-
tain races, they were nevertheless valid since they had some
reasonable basis. Accordingly the district court declined to fol-
low plaintiffs' proposals for preferential hiring of blacks and
Spanish-surnamed persons. However, the court did find that
the employment intelligence test did not bear a significant rela-
tionship to qualifications for policeman and therefore ordered
that any such test may be validated for relevance to employ-
ment performance. 57
On petition for rehearing in Carter, the Eighth Circuit sitting
en banc reversed the initial panel decision. That final decision
did little to resolve this issue of reverse discrimination. The
court merely said, in essence, that some degree of reverse dis-
crimination is essential and is therefore justifiable at least to
the extent of the court's order in the instant case. The court held
that
the absolute preference ordered by the trial court would op-
erate as a present infringement on those non-minority group
persons who are equally or superiorly qualified for the fire
fighter positions; and we hesitate to advocate implementation
of one constitutional guarantee by the outright denial of another.
Yet we acknowledge the legitimacy of erasing the effects of
past racially discriminatory practices.58
To accommodate those conflicting considerations and yet
make the constitutional guarantees against racial discrimination
meaningful in the immediate future, the court concluded that
more than a token representation should be afforded a limited
57. This court's decision was later modified on appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Castro v. Beecher, No.
71-1180, No. 71-1395, No. 71-1396 (lst Cir. April 26, 1972). The basic
guidelines for compensatory -relief ordered by the appellate court con-
sisted of: (1) preparation of a new, non-discriminatory examination
made available to all applicants; (2) creation of a "priority pool" for
all black and Spanish-surnamed applicants who failed any of the 1968-70
examinations, but pass the new examination and are otherwise quali-
fied; (3) creation of a second pool to consist of those on present eligi-
bility lists followed by those who pass the new examination and are
otherwise qualified but are not placed in the priority pool; (4) certifica-
tion by the Director of Civil Service in response to requisition requests
submitted by police departments on the basis of "some ratio." The
court declined to fix such a formula. Rather it left this matter to the
district court upon remand. Id. at 20. In effect, the appellate court's
decree creates a preference only for those specific minority members
who are shown to be the object of the past racially discriminatory ef-
fects of the employment examination. The probable rationale for not
extending this relief to minority classes as a whole is that the court
found that none of the plaintiffs represented the class of minority
members who in the past had been deferred from taking the examina-
tion. Id. at 10.
58. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330 (8th Cir. 1972).
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preference in hiring. The court ultimately recognized that fash-
ioning a remedy in such cases is a practical question which
may differ substantially from case to case and therefore adopted
a one-for-two formula5 9 to the extent that 20 qualified minority
applicants were certified. The court apparently believed that
such a one-for-two formula avoids the legal issues peculiar to
the absolute minority preference.
There is another line of cases which raises issues similar
to those involved in remedial minority preferences. At the
center of this debate is Executive Order 11,246,60 which requires
bidders on federal or federally assisted construction contracts
to submit programs including specific percentage goals for the
utilization of minority workers. Essentially, the Executive Or-
der imposes two distinct obligations on employers. First, those
seeking government contracts must adopt a hiring policy that
is nondiscriminatory. 61 Second, such contractors must under-
take a program of affirmative action to improve representation
of minority workers.6 2 In general, the Executive Order makes it
clear that a neutral posture or inaction by the employer is not
59. The one-for-two formula ordered by the court contemplates the
hiring of one minority applicant out of every three persons hired by the
Fire Department. The court explained that it adopted the one-for-two
formula "as a method of presently eliminating the effects of past racial
discriminatory practices and in making meaningful in the immediate
future the constitutional guarantees against racial discrimination."
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir. 1972). The court rea-
soned that most one-for-one precedents appear to be in areas and occu-
pations with a more substantial minority population than the Minne-
apolis area and thus a one-for-two ratio would be more appropriate in
Carter.
60. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Comp.).
61. Executive Order 11,246, at § 202, 3 C.F.R. 339, 340 (1964-65
Comp.).
62. The responsibilities for affirmative action differ depending on
the nature and amount of the government contractor's business.
Five typical categories of government contracts are:
1. Less than $10,000: not subject to E.O. program. 41 C.F.P
60-1.5 (1970).
2. Less than $50,000 or less than 50 employees: required to
take affirmative action to ensure equal employment oppor-
tunity but not responsible for a written program of compli-
ance. 41 C.F.R. 60-1.40 (a) (1970).
3. More than $50,000 and more than 50 employees: subject to
affirmative action requirements including written program
complying with government regulations. 41 C.F.R. 60-1.40
(a) (1970).
4. Non-construction contracts more than $50,000 and more than
50 employees: subject to more limited, affirmative action.
41 C.F.R. 60-2.1 et seq. (1970).
5. Construction contracts subject to specific affirmative action
requirements of area plans.
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sufficient.63 That is, under the Executive Order affirmative
action is required even when there has been no judicial determi-
nation that an employer in fact has discriminated. The legality
of this order has been consistently upheld even in light of
the greater, yet seemingly less justifiable, imposition on employ-
ers here than in the context of remedial relief in a Title VII or
Section 1981 action.
Three cases64 in particular are representative of the contro-
versy over the validity of specific percentage goals for minority
employment in the context of this Executive Order program.
In each of these cases, the court concluded that affirmative hir-
ing remedies for minority persons are a permissible means of
overcoming present effects of past discriminatory practices. Al-
though in none of these cases was there an explicit finding of
past discrimination, apparently these decisions are based on the
somewhat circular reasoning that no affirmative alteration in
minority representation would be necessary if the composition
of the work force reflected an industry free of past discrimina-
tory practices.
It is apparent that several court orders have incorporated
elementary forms of minority preferences in their relief to the
extent that a one-for-one formula is inherently a type of minor-
ity preference. 65 Yet, there appears, to be a judicial reluctance to
award an absolute minority preference. This hesitation to
award such a preference is apparently based on the objection
that an absolute preference results in reverse discrimination.6
The only court which has thus far faced a plea for an absolute
minority preference 67 ordered instead a one-for-two formula and
suggested that such a formula avoids the constitutional infirmi-
ties inherent in the absolute preference.68 Yet a comparison be-
63. See generally Developments in the Law-Employment Discrim-
ination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv.
1109 (1971).
64. Contractors Ass'n of E. Penn. v. Shultz, 442 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3155 (Oct. 12, 1971); Southern Ill. Build-
ers Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 3 (CCH) E.P.D. 8259 (S.D. Ill.), amended, 3
(CCH) E.P.D. 8260 (S.D. Ill. 1971); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp.
1284 (D.N.J. 1971).
65. To the extent that one-for-one does not represent the ratio of
minority-to-white population, the minority group is preferred. See
note 41 supra and accompanying text.
"66. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971).
67. Carter v. Gallagher, No. 4-70 Civ. 399, 3 (BNA) F.E.P. 692
(D. Minn. March 9, 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 452 F.2d 315,
317-27 (8th Cir. 1971), modified on rehearing, 452 F.2d 315, 327-32 (8th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3557 (May 23, 1972) (No. 71-1265).
68. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 329-30 (8th Cir. 1972).
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tween any such formulas and an absolute preference suggests
otherwise, for the one-for-one formulas 9 raise many of the
same issues as the absolute preference.
First, if the issue of reverse discrimination is present in an
absolute preference, then it is also present in a one-for-one
formula. Regardless of whether the courts ordering one-for-one
remedies have specifically discussed that issue, such orders neces-
sarily involve reverse discrimination unless the class upon which
the ratio operates is already 50% black and 50% white. To the ex-
tent that the ratio does not represent the composition of the
class upon which it operates, the smaller group is preferred.7 0
Second, neither the absolute preference nor the one-for-one
formulas attempt to prefer incompetent minority members, for
none of the ordered preferences require the certification of
any minority applicant irrespective of qualifications. On the
contrary, in order to claim the minority preference, an appli-
cant must obtain the passing score required of all applicants
seeking employment with that employer.7'
Finally, it is conceivable that the reverse discrimination is-
sue would not be reached in either the one-for-one case or the
absolute preference. The reverse discrimination argument is
based on the fact that the preference will operate to award a
job to a minority member who, although qualified, did not at-
tain as high a score on an employment test as a non-preferred
white person. However this is true only if the concept of merit-
based hiring underlies the employment process and if the precise
scores on an employment test are in fact a necessary element to
the concept of merit-based hiring.
Several observations raise serious doubt as to the validity
of these underlying assumptions. First, it might be advanced
that there is no definite legal committment to merit-based hir-
ing in our system. Although it seems to be the predominant
theme of Title VII, it is conceivable that it is so merely because
69. The term "one-for-one formulas" will be used to refer to all
such formulas since it is by far the most common. The same considera-
tions hold true, however, as to one-for-two formulas as employed in
Carter.
70. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
71. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 548 (9th Cir. 1971); Local
53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 478, 479 (W.D.
N.C. 1970). In this respect the minority preference parallels the veter-
ans preference acts. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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merit-based hiring is an obvious assurance against discriminatory
hiring practices. Second, it is arguable that merit-based hiring
really never exists in practice. In many forms of employment,
preference tiers are superimposed upon the group of qualified
applicants. 72  Purely personal preferences as between two
equally qualified applicants or legally sanctioned preferences,
as, for example, the veterans' preference, might combine to re-
sult in a particular order of preference which would be quite a
departure from the order of achievement on an employment test.
As practical matter, employment is seldom granted purely in
the order of achievement on the employment test. Any num-
ber of variables, legally imposed or discretionary, might deter-
mine the criteria for employment. The third consideration
weighing against a committment to merit-based hiring is that
the concept of merit is essentially a myth, at least in view of
present testing technology. Any concept of merit-based hiring
is founded on the underlying assumption that an employment
test measures with accuracy ultimate performance on the job.
However, several commentators have suggested that no test is
capable of measuring with precision any such ultimate perform-
ance.7" This becomes increasingly true when superior qualifi-
cations are determined on the basis of a finely differentiated
absolute score. That is, while the passing score may be indica-
tive of a qualified employee, to argue that a score of 88 is su-
perior to a score of 86 is just not possible under current test-
ing standards. Thus, with no valid criteria for measuring lev-
els of qualification, the concept of infinitely differentiated merit-
based hiring might well be a specious goal. Another approach
in attacking the concept of merit-based hiring might be to
judicially re-define it, i.e., use a definition operative only regard-
ing the point of minimum qualification. But to state that a pass-
ing score qualification system is really equivalent to true merit
hiring is merely to resort to a game of semantics. Such an ap-
proach can better be justified on the grounds that more distinct
differentiation of qualifications simply cannot be accurately
measured.
It appears, then, that judicial reluctance in ordering abso-
lute minority preferences is unfounded in light of the current
72. See, e.g., Finding No. 36, Carter v. Gallagher, No. 4-70 Civ.
399, 3 (BNA) F.E.P. 692, 696 (D. Minn. March 9, 1971).
73. See, e.g., Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair
Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring
and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1598, 1637-69 (1969).
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use of one-for-one formulas. Neither remedy attempts to prefer
incompetent minority employees, and in terms of numbers both
involve some degree of reverse discrimination. The argument
that such preferences are a departure from the concept of merit-
based hiring is unpersuasive. It is not at all clear that there is
any legal commitment to merit-based hiring, and in practice it
probably does not exist today. Moreover, that merit can be
measured beyond mere qualification and non-qualification (i.e.,
a passing score) is probably a myth, at least absent more ad-
vanced test validation procedures.
II. LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
OBSTACLES TO MINORITY
PREFERENCES
Several sociological arguments against minority preferences
in employment have been suggested. The following considera-
tions are representative of such arguments: an effective prefer-
ence system may be extremely expensive both in its implemen-
tation] 7 4 and in its effects; 75 such preference is unfair to those
workers in competition with the preferred minority member;
there are no criteria to suggest when the preference should cease;
it creates the problem that institutionalizing preferential treat-
ment establishes a principle which encourages constant effort
by other ethnic groups to achieve the same kind of treatment
and that this result would involve the government in the admin-
istration of racial classifications. 78 Such arguments are outside
the scope of this discussion. However, the particular legal prob-
lems involved in minority preferences will be analyzed in three
distinct contexts: whether remedial preferences are proscribed
by Title VII, whether such remedies are available under Section
1981 and whether such remedies are constitutionally permis-
sible.
A. Tr=E VII
Title VII raises two distinct issues: first, whether a minor-
74. Active minority recruitment requires a monetary outlay which
is not necessary under normal recruitment conditions.
75. This result is true only when it is assumed that the preference
operates to grant employment to a minority member who, although
qualified, is less qualified than a non-preferred applicant It is ar-
gued that the marginal productivity of that minority applicant is less
than that of the more qualified and results in economic inefficiency.
76. See generally Kaplan, Equal Justice in An Unequal World:
Equality For the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L.
Rsv. 363, 372 (1969).
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ity preference is an available remedy where there has been a vio-
lation of Title VII; and, second, whether the award of a minority
preference itself amounts to a violation of Title VII.
For those actions brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 77 there would appear to be an initial obstacle to the
award of a minority preference. That is, the central objective
of Title VII is to improve minority employment by requiring
employers to use color-blind standards in their hiring and pro-
motion decisions.78  Indeed, it has been argued that the princi-
pal enforcement effort under Title VII should be directed at hir-
ing.79 Accordingly, Section 707 (a) of the Act gives the Attorney
General in a "pattern or practice"8 0 action the authority to re-
quest "such relief, including an application for a permanent in-
junction, restraining order, or other order . . . as he deems nec-
essary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights [t]herein
described."8'
In framing such decrees affecting employment, a court must
carefully distinguish between compensatory relief and injunc-
tions prohibiting further discrimination. Prevention of further
discrimination should not be considered discretionary. It is
the minimal relief required in any discrimination case. 82 Com-
pensatory relief, on the other hand, is designed to make in-
jured members of minority groups whole with respect to the
losses flowing from employers' unlawful conduct.
The courts have gone to great lengths in ordering affirma-
tive relief to fulfill the promise of the statute. Court decrees
have ordered the merger of unions,8 3 the establishment of new
seniority systems,8 4 the development of new objective criteria
for union membership,8 5 and the publication of new nondis-
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (1964).
78. See generally Developments in the Law-Employment Dis-
crimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAnv. L.
REV. 1109 (1971).
79. Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 465, 468 (1968).
80. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1964). See note 91 infra for the text
of this section.
82. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employ-
ment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and
Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1598, 1637-69 (1969).
83. United States v. Papermakers Local 189, 301 F. Supp. 906 (E.D.
La.), aff'd, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
84. Id.
85. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.
1971); Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
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crniinatory union practices."0 Pattern or practice actions have
obtained relief both for specfically named individuals who were
not parties to the action and for minorities as a class.87
The only statutory limitation on the use of affirmative re-
lief is the anti-preferential treatment provision of Section 703
(j).88 This section and Section 703(a)8 9 are the sources of the
argument that Congress has proscribed preferences in em-
ployment. These two sections suggest that the use of numerical
hiring objectives which tend to discriminate against white ap-
plicants is illegal since preferential treatment of one group nec-
essarily results in "discrimination" against the other. Read to-
gether, Sections 703(a) and 703(j) indicate that the policy of Ti-
tle VII is to insure the neutrality of the hiring process.
However, these provisions must be read in conjunction with
the fundamental purposes of the statute 0 and the sections au-
1969). See also United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416
F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
86. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123
(8th Cir. 1969).
87. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.
1971); Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 478(W.D.N.C. 1970); United States v. Local 10, Sheet Metal Workers, 3(CCH) E.P.D. 8068 (D.N.J. 1970); United States v. Frazer, 317 F.
Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970); United States v. Plumbers Local 73, 314
F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964). That section provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to
require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, orjoint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of
such individual or group on account of an imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of
persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin em-
ployed by any employer, referred or classified for employ-
ment by any employment agency or labor organization, ad-
mitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or
admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other train-
ing program, in comparison with the total number or percentage
of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in
any community, State, section or other area, or in the available
work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
89. Section 703 (a) of the Act, its general anti-discrimination pro-
vision, makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual ... because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origim" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1964).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964). That section provides as follows:
It shall be unlawfdl employment practice for a labor organiza-
tion-(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or
otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of
his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
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thorizing affirmative relief.9 1 Moreover, color-consciousness has
been deemed appropriate in Title VII remedies.9 2 Courts which
have addressed this issue of reconciling the Title VII language
have concluded that Sections 703(a) and 703(j) cannot be con-
strued as a ban on affirmative relief against continuation of ef-
fects of past discrimination. As a basis for this conclusion, it has
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to
classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any in-
dividual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit
such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to dis-
criminate against an individual in violation of this section.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964); 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-6 (1964). The
pertinent parts of those sections provide:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged
in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment prac-
tice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the re-
spondent from engaging in such unlawful employment prac-
tice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with
or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment
agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible
for the unlawful employment practice). Interim earnings or
amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or
persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back
pay otherwise allowable. No order of the court shall require
the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member
of a union or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an in-
dividual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back
pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or
expelled or was refused employment or advancement or was
suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimina-
tion on account of race color, religion, sex, or national origin
or in violation of section 2000e-3 (a) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe
that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or
practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights
secured by this subchapter, and that the pattern or practice is
of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the
rights herein described, the Attorney General may bring a
civil action in the appropriate district court of the United States
by filing with it a complaint (1) signed by him (or in his
absence the Acting Attorney General), (2) setting forth facts
pertaining to such pattern or practice, and (3) requesting such
relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order or other order against the person or
persons responsible for such pattern or practice, as he deems
necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights herein
described.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (a) (1964).
92. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d
920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968); Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22, 24 (2d
Cir. 1967); Porcelli v. Titus, 302 F. Supp. 726 (D. N.J. 1969), af 'd,
431 F.2d 1254 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971).
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been said that "Congress did not intend to freeze an entire gen-
eration of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that ex-
isted before the Act.' 93 Consequently, the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded in United States v. International Brotherhood, Local 38,
that "any other interpretation would allow the complete nul-
lification of the stated purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."1 4
These anti-preferential sections also have provoked contin-
uing controversy over the validity of the statistical "goals"
required of prospective government contractors under Executive
Order 11,246.95 Such numerical employment objectives, it is ar-
gued, place serious pressures on the merit-based hiring process
contemplated by Title V1. 9 6 Yet numerical objectives may be
the only feasible way to move employment practices in the direc-
tion of true neutrality.
This specific issue was before the Third Circuit in Con-
tractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Schultz.97
There the court concluded that to read Section 703(j) as a pro-
scription against numerical objectives would be "to attribute to
Congress the intention to freeze the status quo and to foreclose
remedial action under other authority designed to overcome ex-
isting evils." 98 Although the Philadelphia Plan was found to be
color-conscious, the court rejected the contention that Title
VII prevents the President acting through the Executive Order
program from attempting to remedy the absence of minority
tradesmen in the construction industry. Other courts also have
upheld the legality of Executive Order 11,246 as not inconsistent
with the provisions of Title VII.99 In other words, these courts
93. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 514 (EM.
Va. 1968). The Quaries case rejected the contention that existing
non-discriminatory seniority arrangements were so sanctified by Title
VII that the effects of past discrimination in job assignments could not
be overcome.
94. United States v. International Brotherhood Local 38, 428 F.2d
144, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970). See also
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553-54 (9th Cir.
1971); Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1053-55
(5th Cir. 1969).
95. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
96. See generally Developments in the Law-Employment Dis-
crimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAv. L. Rsv.
1109 (1971).
97. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971).
98. Id. at 173.
99. Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 3 (CCH) E.P.D. 8259
(SD. I1.), amended, 3 (CCH) E.P.D. V 8260 (S.D. IIl. 1971); Joyce v.
McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D. N.J. 1970).
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have concluded that the minority preferences in the Executive
Order do not amount to a violation of Title VII.
A possible authority for the argument that minority prefer-
ences are proscribed by Title VII can be found in the recent Su-
preme Court decision of Griggs v. Duke Power Company:100
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee ajob to every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the
Act does not command that any person be hired simply because
he was formerly the subject of discrimination or because he
is the member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference
for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what
Congress has proscribed. What is required by Congress is the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to em-
ployment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate
on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.
The decision in Carter v. Gallagher extended this language, cit-
ing it as authority for the proposition that "section 1981 and the
Fourteenth Amendment proscribe any discrimination in employ-
ment, whether the discrimination be against Whites or against
Blacks."'' 1  This language was relied on as authority for the
proposition that any preferential treatment in hiring for minori-
ties is unconstitutional.
However, this language requires closer examination before
it may be argued that the minority preference is inconsistent
with the Griggs decision. First of all, it is relevant that the is-
sue before the Supreme Court in that case was not the validity
of the type of relief available in Title VII actions, but rather
the legality under Title VII of certain employment testing re-
quirements. Since the remedy issue was not directly before
the court such language assumes the quality of dicta.
In context, the passage from Griggs refers to a minority
member's lack of qualifications for a particular job. The Court
is commenting on the consistently low score attained by minor-
ity applicants on the written examination given by Duke Power
Company. This, the Court says, is a direct result of inferior
education received in segregated schools.10 2 However, merely
because racial discrimination in the schools indirectly affects
black eligibility for employment, the Court suggests that such
discrimination does not, in itself, entitle blacks to employment
for it overlooks an underlying inability to perform the job.
100. 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (March 8, 1971).
101. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971), citing
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 325 (8th Cir. 1971).
102. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
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Yet this entire discussion was ancillary to the Court's findings,
for the Court concluded that the test was not, in fact, a demon-
strably reasonable measure of job performance.
Second, the passage from Griggs, cited in Carter, relates to
the question of what constitutes a violation of Title VII, not to
the question of what constitutes a proper remedy. The passage
simply makes clear that it is not a violation of Title VII to re-
fuse to hire a minority person who is not qualified for the job
in question, or less qualified than a white who is hired. In
other words, the passage indicates that the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is not designed to accord members of a minority race a spe-
cial privilege or right merely because of their race, creed or color.
However, the passage does not preclude the use of minority pref-
erences to correct the effects of past discrimination. To inter-
pret Griggs so restrictively doubtless would frustrate the Su-
preme Court's mandate to eliminate the present effects of past
discrimination. 10 3 In the absence of some kind of preferential
treatment to minorities, the only relief available in many in-
stances would be the elimination of present causes of past dis-
crimination. Yet it is imperative to provide effective and timely
relief to dispel the continuing effects of past discrimination.0 4
Finally, it must be noted that up to the present, the Eighth
Circuit has been the only circuit to use the language from Griggs
to ban affirmative relief. All other citations of Griggs to date
deal with the legality of testing requirements.'0 5 Indeed, the
Eighth Circuit subsequently recognized en banc that such a rem-
edy might well be available under Title VII and that the language
did not warrant application in a Section 1981 action:
103. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
104. Compare the development in almost two decades of school
desegregation cases which demonstrates that relief which is immedi-
ately effective must be given in racial discrimination cases. For years
the courts and school districts proceeded with "all deliberate speed" in
accordance with Brown v. Board of Ed., 349 U.S. 294 (1954). Finally
the lower courts in Jackson v. Marvell School Dist. No. 22, 416 F.2d 380(8th Cir. 1969), and the Supreme Court in Green v. County School
Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1967), and in United States v. Montgomery County
Bd. of Ed., 395 U.S. 225 (1965), declared the demise of the all-deliberate-
speed doctrine and mandated affirmative steps effectively geared to
end segregation.
105. Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.
1971); Contractors Ass'n of E. Penn. v. Schultz, 442 F.2d 159, 172 (3rd
Cir. 1971); Baker v. Columbus Municipal School Dist., 3 (CCH) E.P.D.
f 8308 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 3 (CCH) E.P.D.
V 8282 (S.D. N.Y. 1971); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Fitters Local
638, 326 F. Supp. 198, 202 (S.D. N.Y. 1971); Armstead v. Starkville
Municipal Separate School Dist., 325 F. Supp. 560, 570 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
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[T]he anti-preference treatment section of the new Civil Rights
Act of 1964 does not limit the power of a court to order af-
firmative relief to correct the effects of past unlawful prac-
tices.106
Thus it would appear that a minority preference does not of-
fend the provisions of Title VII if the preference is fashioned
as remedial relief to correct the effects of past discrimination or
as a numerical goal designed to move employment practices in
the direction of true neutrality.
B. SEcTioN 1981
Even if minority preferences are found to be a remedy in-
consistent with Title VII, several viable arguments may be ad-
vanced that a court is nevertheless free to award minority
preferences in a Section 1981 action. Section 1981 and Title VII
differ in several substantive ways. In general, the scope of Sec-
tion 1981 is broader than the scope of Title VII. Title VII reaches
fewer acts of discrimination, offers less immediate access to
the courts, and has a shorter operative statute of limitations.'0 7
Since 1880, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress
intended Section 1981 to have as broad a scope as the Fourteenth
Amendment. 08 On its face, that section appears to prohibit
acts of racial discrimination by private individuals. But it was
rendered ineffectual by cases holding that it and Section 1982
were never intended to reach private acts of discrimination,I0 0
but were intended only to implement the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and thus required some degree of state action, 110 and could
not be supported by the Thirteenth Amendment, which was con-
cerned only with the abolition of slavery."' However, the
106. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 329 (8th Cir. 1972) (rehearing
en banc).
107. See generally Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employ-
ment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. Ci. L. REv. 615 (1969);
Note, Is Section 1981 Modified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1223.
108. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 407, 422-36 (1966);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Hurd v. Hodge, 334
U.S. 24, 32 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 69, 77-79 (1917);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886); Virginia v. Rives,
100 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
312 (1880).
109. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 407, 454 (1966) (dis-
senting opinion); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883).
110. Hurd v. Hodges, 334 U.S. 24, 31-32 (1948); Virginia v. Rives,
100 U.S. 313, 317 (1880).
111. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926); Hodges v.
United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1906).
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Civil Rights Act of 1866 was revitalized in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., when the Court held that "section 1982 bars all racial
discrimination, private as well as public."112
Section 1981 does not specify the manner of judicial
relief available in such an action. Yet this fact should not
limit the courts in framing appropriate relief. Its counterpart,
Section 1982, is likewise framed only in declaratory terms, but
the Supreme Court has held that a federal court is not thereby
precluded from fashioning an effective equitable remedy.'13 The
substantive scope of relief available, then, is a matter of the
equitable powers of the federal courts.
Indeed, this substantive scope of relief offered by Section
1981 might well be broader than that of Title VII. Section 1981
contains no explicit prohibition of minority preferences. More-
over, even if such a prohibition is found inherent in Title VII it
does not necessarily mean that remedies under Section 1981 are
similarly limited. It is well settled that Title VII did not im-
plicitly repeal Section 1981.114 Also, Section 1981 may pro-
vide a broader remedy than Title VII because in addition to the
injunctive relief, reinstatement, and award of back pay available
under Title VII, Section 1981 includes at least the possibility
of exemplary damages. 15
C. CONSTrUTIONA=ITY OF REMEDIAL PREFERENCES
Since neither act explicitly proscribes this type of remedy,
the controlling question would seem to be not whether a court is
precluded by Title VII or Section 1981 from awarding a remedial
112. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 407, 413 (1966).
113. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 407, 414 (1966). See
also Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970);
Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D. Mont. 1969).
114. See Spring v. International Tel. & Tel., 438 F.2d 757 (3rd Cir.
1971); Sanders v. Dobbs House, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Inter-
national Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub
nom United Order of American Bricklayers, Local 21 v. Waters, 400
U.S. 911 (1970) and International Harvester Co. v. Waters, 400 U.S. 911
(1970). See also Note, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. Car. L. REv. 615 (1969).
115. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). See
also Note, Is Section 1981 Modified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964?, 1970 DuKE L.J. 1223. But see Note, Racial Discrimination in
Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. CHL L. REv. 615,
640 (1969), for the suggestion that except for avoiding a delay of up to
120 days, a plaintiff can accomplish nothing under Section 1981 which he
cannot under Title VIL
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minority preference in a discrimination case, but rather, whether
such a preference is constitutionally permissible. Classification
by race to some extent is a necessary corollary of Louisiana v.
United States."6 This method may be unlawful under a possible
Fourteenth Amendment per se rule against the imposition of
burdens or denial of benefits on a racial basis, 1 7 that is, a "col-
orblind" interpretation of the equal protection clause. The
concept originated in Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Fer-
guson."58 Yet most commentators agree that the Court has
never given majority support to the doctrine of the "colorblind"
Constitution, rejecting a per se rule proscribing the legitimacy of
classifications by race.1 9
Rather, racial classifications in almost all contexts have
been described as "suspect' 120 and, while not absolutely pre-
cluded by the Constitution, must be subjected to a rigorous
scrutiny. 12' Indeed, when framing equitable relief in discrim-
ination cases, the federal courts have not hesitated to consider
race. 22 For example, the courts have rejected the proposition
that faculty assignments by race consitute prohibited racial dis-
crimination, 23 and have affirmed that classification by race is a
permissible, indeed a constitutionally mandated, means to
achieve equal treatment of the races:
What we have said may require classification by race. That is
something which the Constitution usually forbids not because
116. 380 U.S. 145 (1965). See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (Stewart,
J., concurring); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stew-
art, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring); Kotch v. Board of River
Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 566 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Cf. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) (Jackson, J., con-
curring).
118. 163 U.S. 537, 558 (1896).
119. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
REV. 1065, 1088-91 (1969), for this suggestion.
120. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
121. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
122. The classic statement of the necessity of such relief was made
by Judge Wisdom in United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Ed., 372
F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966):
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious. To
avoid conflict with the equal protection clause, a classification
that denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden
must not be based on race. But the Constitution is color con-
scious to prevent discrimination being perpetrated and to undo
the effects of past discrimination. The criteria is the relevancy
of color to a legitimate governmental purpose. (Emphasis added.)
123. Clark v. Board of Ed., 426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970) (Clark
II), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971); Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F.2d 178
(8th Cir. 1968) (Kemp II).
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it is inevitably an impermissible classification, but because it
is one which usually, to our national shame, has been drawn
for the purpose of maintaining a racial inequality. Where it is
drawn for the purpose of achieving equality it will be allowed,
and to the extent it is necessary to avoid unequal treatment by
race, it will be required. 124
Although this statement was made in reference to school inte-
gration,125 the necessity for such relief is central to all discrimi-
nation cases.
It might be suggested that when the purpose of a classifica-
tion by race is compensatory in nature, it is even possible that
such classifications need not be subjected to the usual strict
standard of equal protection review.12  Clearly the social effects
of such remedial classifications are very different from those in
other contexts which the courts have come to view as invidi-
ous.1 27 Consequently, a court might apply a permissive rather
than strict standard of review and still comport with constitu-
tional principles of equal protection.128
However, the constitutional argument is best met in the rec-
ognition that racial classifications are inherently suspect and
must therefore meet a rigorous standard of equal protection
review.12 9 A compelling governmental justification for the mi-
nority preference can exist when other available affirmative re-
lief is ineffective to dispel the continuing effects of past discrimi-
nation. Minority preferences should not be held unconstitu-
124. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d
920, 931-32 (emphasis added). See also Porcelli v. Titus, 302 F. Supp.
726 (D. N.J. 1969); Vierra, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and
Permissible Classification By Race, 67 Micn. L. REv. 1553 (1969).
125. School integration cases can be distinguished on the basis that
unlike a minority preference in employment which operates to exclude
one applicant, no constitutional rights of whites are deprived in de-
crees ordering school busing. Whites have no constitutional right to
insist on segregated schools. Presumably, a student receives the same
state approved education when he is bused to another school as he
would have received had he remained in a segregated school
126. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
127. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 1065, 1104-1120 (1969). See also Leiken, Preferential Treatment in
the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis of the Philadelphia Plan, 56
CoRNEmr, L. REv. 84, 98-100 (1970). But see Kaplan, Equal Justice in an
Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-the Problem of Special Treat-
ment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363, 363-88 (1966).
128. The main objection to this is the possible illogic of a position
that distinguishes between constitutional and unconstitutional racial
classifications solely on the basis that most are "bad" but remedial
ones are "good".
129. See notes 120 & 121 supra and accompanying text.
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tional without such a consideration of the shortcomings of other
relief.
III. CONCLUSION
Where clearly discriminatory practices have been applied in
the employment context and non-preferential affirmative re-
lief is not a timely remedy, the courts should not abdicate
its responsibility to effectively remedy these past denials of
equal employment opportunity. A minority preference, in some
instances, can be the only practical way to correct the adverse
social and economic effects of employment discrimination. Re-
cent case law suggests a trend toward the eventual recog-
nition of the propriety of minority preferences as remedies in
discrimination cases. However, because of the possible constitu-
tional overtones, such preferences must either be truly compen-
satory as a remedy for past discrimination or necessary to the
attainment of a compelling governmental purpose.
